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IS DRIVING WITH THE INTENT TO GATHER 
NEWS A CRIME?   
THE CHILLING EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S 
ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION 
Christina M. Locke∗ & Kara Carnley Murrhee∞ 
  
While celebrities may have a love-hate relationship with the photog-
raphers who give them red carpet publicity but also pursue shots of their 
most intimate moments, the California Legislature has little use for the pa-
parazzi.  The 2010 anti-paparazzi bill is the most recent in a string of legis-
lative attempts to curb aggressive paparazzi.  Assembly Bill 2479 makes 
two major changes.  The first change penalizes those who capture images 
or audio recordings by false imprisonment, targeting paparazzi who swarm 
celebrities and prevent them from moving or driving freely.  The second 
change enhances penalties for reckless driving if one has an intent to pho-
tograph or record.  This Article examines the constitutionality of Califor-
nia’s most recent anti-paparazzi law, concluding Assembly Bill 2479, like 
California’s prior anti-paparazzi laws, needlessly modifies existing law at 
the expense of the First Amendment guarantee of a free press. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
They sit at the end of celebrities’ driveways day and night.  They fol-
low relentlessly in cars,1 waiting to catch that perfect moment on film so 
                                                           
∗ Joseph L. and Marion B. Brechner Research Fellow, University of Florida.  Member, 
State Bar of Georgia. 
∞ Graduate research associate for the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and 
student at the Fredric G. Levin College of Law at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.  
B.A., 2006, Mass Communication, University of Central Florida; M.A., 2010, Mass Communica-
tion, University of Florida. 
1.  See Kelly Jane Torrence, Shutterbugged:  Paparazzi’s Aggressiveness in Pursuit of 
Candid Celebrity Photos Risks Lives, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at D1 (describing some of the 
paparazzi’s aggressive driving tactics that put lives at risk); see also Schwarzenegger Terminates 
Paparazzi, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (Oct. 23, 2009), 
http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/people/Schwarzenegger-terminates-paparazzi-20091023-
hc1s.html (“Numerous Hollywood stars, including Paris Hilton, Nicole Richie and Halle Berry, 
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they can sell it for hundreds, thousands, or even millions of dollars.2  They 
are the paparazzi.3  While celebrities may have a love-hate relationship 
with the photographers who give them publicity while chasing them all 
over Hollywood, the California Legislature has little use for the paparazzi.  
In 2010, California law once again placed these camera-brandishing, celeb-
rity-stalking photographers in the limelight instead of the Hollywood su-
perstars that are usually the focus of their snapshots.4  The 2010 anti-
paparazzi bill, Assembly Bill (A.B.) 2479, is the most recent in a string of 
legislative attempts to curb aggressive paparazzi.5  The legislative attention 
to paparazzi tactics began in 1998, when invasion of privacy was codified 
in response to Princess Diana’s death.6  In 2005, legislators amended the 
law to penalize photographers who sold photos taken during altercations 
with celebrities.7  Finally, in 2009, legislators targeted publishers of photos 
taken in the course of an invasion of privacy.8  That law also permits public 
prosecutors to pursue violations of the statute on behalf of celebrities.9 
 However, tougher penalties and increased opportunities for prosecu-
tion, which went into effect January 1, 2010, did not shutter the paparazzi’s 
snapshots,10 as news stories detailing the latest celebrity-photographer run-
                                                                                                                                        
have been involved in traffic collisions in recent years that allegedly involved paparazzi or their 
chases.”). 
2.  Schwarzenegger Signs Tougher Anti-Paparazzi Law, CBSNEWS.COM, (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/12/ap/extras/main5380372.shtml (“Tabloid magazines, 
TV shows and Internet sites sometimes pay millions of dollars for celebrity fodder.”); see also 
Schwarzenegger Terminates Paparazzi, supra note 1 (“Paparazzi are driven by prospects of big 
bucks—up to six-figure payoffs—for jaw-dropping images of tabloid stars from Angelina Jolie to 
Tom Cruise, Kristen Stewart and Taylor Lautner.”). 
3.  Paparazzo Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 840 (10th ed. 
1993) (defining “paparazzo” as “a free-lance photographer who aggressively pursues celebrities 
for the purpose of taking candid photographs”). 
4.  See Anti-Paparazzi Bill Ready for Governor’s Blessing, MALIBU TIMES, (Sept. 1, 
2010), http://www.malibutimes.com/articles/2010/09/02/news/news3.prt. 
5.  See Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted). 
6.  See Diana Death Brings Flash of Paparazzi Legislation, ALLBUSINESS.COM, (Sept. 3, 
1997), http://www.allbusiness.com/services/motion-pictures/4893034-1.html [hereinafter Diana 
Death Brings Flash] (“Paris car crash sparked outcries Tuesday from lawmakers seeking new 
legislation to better protect celebrities from the dogged pursuit of paparazzi.”); see also John-
Thor Dahlburg, Charges Dropped Against Paparazzi Implicated in Princess Diana Crash, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1999, at A6 (“Widespread fury rose quickly at the idea that the paparazzi might 
have hounded the popular and beautiful princess to her death, coolly snapping photos as life 
ebbed from her.”). 
7.  See Out of the Picture Now:  Aggressive Paparazzi, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 2006, at A13. 
8.  Assemb. B. 524, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted). 
9.  Id. 
10.  S. Judiciary Comm., B. Analysis, A.B. 2479, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1–2 (Cal. 
June, 22, 2010) (“Despite the enactment of these statutory remedies, there continues to be a flurry 
of news reports on the increasing tension between celebrities and photographers, which at times 
has escalated to the point of physical confrontations.”); see also Nicole LaPorte, The Do-Nothing 
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in continued to make headlines.  In February 2010, state officials filed 
criminal charges against Sean Penn, who now faces 1.5 years in jail, for an 
alleged attack on a photographer.11  In June 2010, Mad Men star January 
Jones alleged that she lost control of her car and collided with several 
parked cars because the paparazzi were following her.12  That same month, 
a seventeen-year-old photographer accused Jodie Foster of assaulting him 
after he apparently tailed her and her children too closely as they left a 
theater.13  Although supporters of the 2009 bill believed it would help curb 
the abuses of paparazzi who stalk celebrities to catch candid photos, oppo-
nents questioned whether the law would be effective, create a flurry of law-
suits,14 or even be upheld if challenged in court.15   
                                                                                                                                        
Paparazzi Law, THEDAILYBEAST.COM (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-
and-stories/2010-02-25/the-do-nothing-paparazzi-law. 
11.  Penn was criminally charged with battery and vandalism for allegedly attacking a pho-
tographer in Los Angeles.  Richard Winton, Penn Is Charged in Battery Case:  Officials Say the 
Actor Kicked a Photographer and Broke His Camera, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A4. 
12.  Mad Men Star January Jones Won’t Be Investigated in Crash, CARBONATED.TV 
(June 11, 2010, 6:50:56 PM), http://www.carbonated.tv/entertainment/mad-men-star-january. 
13.  Alan Duke, Jodie Foster Is Suspect in Battery Against Teen, CNN.COM (June 11, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-11/entertainment/jodie.foster.assault.probe_1_paparazzi-
suspect-teen?-s=pm:showbiz. 
14.  See Will California’s New Anti-Paparazzi Law Unleash a Torrent of Law Suits?, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 14, 2009, 8:35 AM), http://www.blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/14will-
california-new-anti-paparazzi-law-unleash-a-torrent-of-law-suits/. 
15.  Indeed, in a letter from the Radio Television Digital News Association to California 
Assemblyperson Karen Bass (D-Los Angeles) (sponsor of both A.B. 524 and A.B. 2479), the or-
ganization insisted the first publication law “would, among other things, unduly chill important 
speech and contravene the established right of news organizations to publish or broadcast images 
that are newsworthy or otherwise of public concern.”  Letter from the Radio Television Digital 
News Ass’n to Cal. Assemb. Karen Bass (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/rtnda-opposes-california-legislation-restricting-news-
gathering1835.php; see also Courtney Reimer, California’s New Anti-Paparazzi Bill Allows Ce-
lebrities to Sue Publications, FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION (Oct. 13, 2009), 
http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2009/10/californias-new-anti-paparazzi-bill-allows-
celebrities-to-sue-publications.  According to the Coalition: 
 
While few would advocate the invasion of anyone’s privacy—celebrities or other-
wise—this new law could be seen as an erosion of the First Amendment.  Freedom 
of the press and libel laws thus far have been less restrictive of material concerning 
public figures, who are by nature of their business less subject to privacy laws. 
 
See also Christina M. Locke, Does Anti-Paparazzi Mean Anti-Press?:  First Amendment Implica-
tions of Privacy Legislation for the Newsroom, 20 SETON HALL. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 227, 247 
(2010) (“Privacy laws like California’s 2009 amendment to section 1708.8 of its civil code 
threaten the First Amendment, waste taxpayer resources, and pander to wealthy and politically 
influential celebrities.”). 
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In September 2010, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger16 signed the 
newest law, A.B. 2479, which makes two major changes.17  The first 
change penalizes those who capture images or audio recordings by false 
imprisonment.18  The law’s ostensible goal is to target paparazzi who 
swarm celebrities and prevent them from moving or driving freely.19  The 
second change the law institutes is to add enhanced penalties for reckless 
driving if one has an intent to photograph or record.20  The potential for 
these measures to violate the First Amendment by having a chilling effect 
on newsgathering is the focus of this Article. 
 This Article examines the constitutionality of California’s most re-
cent anti-paparazzi law, A.B. 2479.  Part I discusses the history of Califor-
nia’s anti-paparazzi laws and previous First Amendment challenges, in-
cluding the latest legislative attempt to curb paparazzi by increasing 
penalties for false imprisonment and creating a new category of reckless 
driving with the intent to photograph.  Part II analyzes A.B. 2479 from a 
First Amendment standpoint, using a variety of applicable First Amend-
ment doctrines.  Finally, Part III concludes that A.B. 2479, like the prior 
anti-paparazzi laws, needlessly modifies existing law at the expense of the 
First Amendment guarantee of a free press.  
II.  CALIFORNIA AND ANTI-PAPARAZZI LAWS 
On August 31, 1997, news that Princess Diana had died in a car crash 
in a Paris tunnel, while photographers chased her car, spread quickly.21  
                                                           
16.  Schwarzenegger, an actor prior to being elected governor of California, has had his 
own share of run-ins with the paparazzi.  In 1998, two photographers were convicted of misde-
meanor false imprisonment charges after an incident with Schwarzenegger and his family outside 
his son’s preschool.  Robert W. Welkos, Paparazzi Guilty in Schwarzenegger Case, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 3, 1998, at B1. 
17.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted).  
18.  Id. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2010)). 
19.  Assemb. Judiciary Comm., B. Analysis, A.B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 30, 2010).  According to bill sponsor Assemblyperson Karen Bass: 
 
[T]his bill is intended to curb the reckless and dangerous lengths that paparazzi will 
sometimes go in order to capture the image of celebrities.  Of particular concern is 
the practice of surrounding a celebrity or the celebrity’s vehicle in a manner that 
does not permit an avenue of escape.  In addition, paparazzi have allegedly engaged 
in dangerous and high-speed chases on the public highways in their efforts to cap-
ture photographs.  The author contends that this kind of behavior is especially a 
problem in Los Angeles, with its high concentration of stars and celebrities.  
 
20.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103 (West 2010)). 
21.  See, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, Diana Killed in Car Crash in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
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When a French judge declared seven paparazzi suspects in the investiga-
tion,22 celebrities and lawmakers in Europe23 and the United States, namely 
California,24 demanded new legislation to quell the dangerous paparazzi 
tactics.25  Though Congress considered but did not enact any such legisla-
tion,26 California moved very quickly to enact the first state anti-paparazzi 
law.27  However, a judge eventually concluded that Diana’s impaired 
driver, not the paparazzi, was responsible for the crash.28 
A.  California’s Previous Legislative Attempts at Curbing Paparazzi 
California’s 1998 law provided statutory causes of action for both 
physical and “constructive” invasion of privacy.29  The “constructive” pro-
vision was aimed at preventing the use of “visual or auditory enhancing 
device[s]” to capture photos of celebrities engaging in “personal or familial 
                                                                                                                                        
31, 1997 (Late Ed.) at A1; Ann O’Neill, Paparazzi Pursuit Was a Constant for Diana, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at A9. 
22.  Diana Death Brings Flash, supra note 6. 
23.  After the death of Princess Diana, the Council of Europe modified the European Con-
vention on Human Rights to broadly define privacy rights.  Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 
6, 7, 12 and 13, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/ rdon-
lyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf.  In one notable case, Von 
Hannover v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights found that Princess Caroline of 
Monaco’s privacy rights were violated when she was photographed during recreational pursuits.  
See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 44.  A concurring judge in Von Han-
nover wrote that “courts have to some extent and under American influence made a fetish of the 
freedom of the press.”  Id. at 78 (Zupancic, J., concurring); see also Patrick J. Alach, Comment, 
Paparazzi and Privacy, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 205, 220 (2008) (arguing that American law 
prioritizes the First Amendment over privacy rights while European law puts the two on equal 
footing). 
24.  Todd S. Purdum, Two Senators Propose Anti-Paparazzi Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 1998, at A16 (quoting one of the bill’s sponsors, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, as having said that 
the death of Princess Diana stimulated efforts to enact a law addressing the “increasingly aggres-
sive cadre of fortune seekers with cameras”). 
25.  Diana Death Brings Flash, supra note 6. 
26.  See Protection From Personal Intrusion Act, H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997); Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. (1998); Personal Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 
4425, 105th Cong. (1998); Personal Privacy Protection Act, S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998); see 
also Larysa Pyk, Putting the Brakes on Paparazzi:  State and Federal Legislators Propose Pri-
vacy Protection Bills, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 187, 193–97 (1998); Randall 
Boese, Redefining Privacy?  Anti-Paparazzi Legislation and Freedom of the Press, 17 COMM. 
LAW. 1, 23 (Summer 1999). 
27.  California Passes Law to Rein in Paparazzi, CNN.COM, (Oct. 1, 1998), 
http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/Movies/9810/01/paparazzi.bill/index.html. 
28.  Dahlburg, supra note 6. 
29.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a)–(b) (West 2009). 
 
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:83 
activity.”30  The constitutional implications of the 1998 law raised concerns 
among the media law bar and the press.31  Opponents argued the law could 
violate constitutional protections for newsgathering and was vague and 
overbroad.32  The breadth of the statute and its target on the media 
prompted some media attorneys to lament that the “statute opens a Pan-
dora’s box of issues that may take years to sort out.”33 
 Far from sorting out the “Pandora’s box” of the initial statute, the 
California Legislature continued to pass more of the same constitutionally 
suspect laws.  The first amendment to the 1998 invasion of privacy statute 
came in 2005 and was aimed at photos taken during altercations between 
celebrities and photographers.34  The 2005 amendment called for photogra-
phers who had assaulted celebrities to forfeit profits from the publication of 
the resulting photos.35  It also allowed for triple damages against the papa-
razzi in civil suits stemming from the altercations.36  Assemblyperson 
Cindy Montanez (D-San Fernando) pointed to a recent incident involving 
actress Lindsay Lohan as evidence of the need for the law, which took ef-
fect in 2006.37 
 Celebrity run-ins with paparazzi continued in the years following 
the passage of the 2005 amendment.38  Thus, in 2009, California lawmakers 
                                                           
30.  Id. § 1708.8(b).  The statute was essentially a codification and expansion of Prosser’s 
common law tort of intrusion.  The concept of an individual right of privacy originated in an 1890 
Harvard Law Review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.  See Samuel Warren & Louis 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  Prosser, in a 1960 law review, ar-
ticulated four types of invasion of privacy:  intrusion; public disclosure of private facts; false light 
in the public eye; and appropriation.  These were subsequently included in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A–E (1977). 
31.  See, e.g., Kelli Sager & Randall Boese, Redefining Privacy in California?  The “Anti-
Paparazzi Legislation,” MONDAQ.COM (July 13, 2001), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=12654. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Assemb. B. 381, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (enacted). 
35.  Id.; see CIV. § 1708.8(d). 
36.  Assemb. B. 381, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (enacted); see CIV. 
§ 1708.8(d). 
37.  See Steve Lawrence, Governor Signs Paparazzi Bill, LONG BEACH PRESS-
TELEGRAM, Oct. 1, 2005, at A18; Sandy Cohen, Anti-Paparazzi Law Raises Constitutional Con-
cerns, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 31, 2005, at B5. 
38.  See, e.g., Harriet Ryan, Paparazzo, Actor Keanu Reeves Testify in Court, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 2008, at B5; Andrew Blankstein, At LAX, Celebs Deal with Excess Baggage:  Paparazzi; 
Kanye West Lands in Jail After a Scuffle With Two Photographers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at 
A1; Ari B. Bloomekatz, Paparazzo Says Surfers Accosted Him in Malibu:  Photographer Trying 
to Get Shots of Matthew McConaughey at the Beach Says a Camera was Tossed into the Ocean, 
L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at B3; Richard Winton, Paparazzo Fails to Come to Court:  Warrants 
are Issued for Todd K. Wallace, Who is Wanted in a Child Endangerment and Battery Case In-
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once again sought new ways to protect celebrities.  This time, they set their 
sights higher up the editorial food chain.  The new law, A.B. 524, estab-
lished penalties of up to $50,000 for first publishers of photos obtained in 
contravention of California’s privacy statute.39  The bill’s sponsor, Assem-
blyperson Karen Bass (D-Los Angeles), “hoped to remove the financial in-
centive for paparazzi to continue pursuing and photographing celebrities.”40  
Considering that prime photos can fetch more than a million dollars, this 
seems unlikely.  Nonetheless, first publishers with “actual knowledge”41 
that the photo was taken in a way “that is offensive to a reasonable person” 
would be subject to the penalties.42  This portion of the statute seems 
squarely in conflict with a line of U.S. Supreme Court holdings that have 
turned down attempts to punish the press for publishing lawfully obtained 
information.43 
The 2009 legislation also authorized government attorneys to move 
forward with civil actions based on the harms suffered by celebrities.44  
Prosecutors may pursue civil actions against publishers and photographers 
for violations of the privacy statute.45  Proceeds would be distributed 
among the prosecuting agency itself, as well as an Arts and Entertainment 
Fund.46  These prosecutions could open taxpayers to the possibility of foot-
ing expensive legal bills on behalf of celebrities and subject the press to the 
high costs of defending such lawsuits. 
B.  A.B. 2479:  Driving with the Intent to Commit Journalism? 
 Just months after the privacy amendment targeting first publishers 
of photos went into effect on January 1, 2010, yet another anti-paparazzi 
bill was introduced to the California Assembly.47  An early legislative 
analysis of the bill noted: 
                                                                                                                                        
volving Reese Witherspoon, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at B3. 
39.  Assemb. B. 524, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted). 
40.  S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). 
41.  CIV. § 1708.8(f)(1). 
42.  Id. § 1708.8(a). 
43.  See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524, 541 (1989); Landmark Comm. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); N.Y. Times v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
44.  Assemb. B. 524, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Feb. 19, 2010) (enacted). 
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Despite the enactment of [previous] statutory remedies, there 
continues to be a flurry of news reports on the increasing tension 
between celebrities and photographers, which at times has esca-
lated to the point of physical confrontations.  Defenders of the 
paparazzi allege that the problem is not the paparazzi, but rather 
the public’s appetite to learn about even the most mundane de-
tails of the celebrities’ lives.  Some also assert that celebrities 
themselves want the best of both worlds, seeking out the cam-
eras when they want to bask in the limelight, and smashing those 
same cameras on the ground when they find them annoying.48 
 
As first introduced, the bill incorporated “the tort of stalking” into the 
privacy statute, looking to “impose liability when the defendant engaged in 
a pattern of conduct intended to place the victim under surveillance . . . .”49  
Surveillance was defined as “that pattern of conduct [that] caused the plain-
tiff to reasonably suffer substantial emotional distress.”50  Assemblyperson 
Karen Bass, who also introduced the 2009 anti-paparazzi bill,51 sought to 
amend both the civil anti-stalking and privacy statutes in “an effort to curb 
the often aggressive tactics used by paparazzi to capture images and record-
ing of celebrities and their families in order to satiate a public that clamors 
for the intimate details of the lives of Hollywood stars.”52  The “surveil-
lance” version was later amended “in order to craft language that will ad-
dress the issue of unlawful and dangerous surveillance without limiting 
constitutionally protected activities.”53  The surveillance and anti-stalking 
aspects of the bill were replaced with new provisions addressing false im-
prisonment and reckless driving.54 
A.B. 2479, as enacted in fall 2010, ostensibly targets two problematic 
situations that occur when photographers seek photos of celebrities:  1) pa-
parazzi follow celebrities in their cars in an effort to track the celebrities’ 
                                                           
48.  S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). 
49.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (as amended Apr. 28, 
2010). 
50.  Id. 
51.  Legislation, THE PAPARAZZI REFORM INITIATIVE, http://www.paparazzi-
reform.org/legislation/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
52.  Assemb. Floor, B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. 
May 13, 2010) (noting that according to Bass, the bill would “prevent paparazzi from loitering 
outside of a celebrity’s home or place of work”). 
53.  S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 6–7 
(Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
54.  Id. at 4–5. 
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whereabouts, which sometimes leads to high-speed chases and collisions; 
and 2) paparazzi crowd a celebrity in such a manner that makes it difficult 
or impossible for him or her to move freely.55  To combat the first problem, 
A.B. 2479 amended the California Vehicle Code, establishing additional 
criminal and financial penalties for reckless driving if one does so “with the 
intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physi-
cal impression of another person for a commercial purpose.”56  Existing 
law punishes reckless driving with an infraction and jail time of 5 to 90 
days or a fine between $145 and $1,000.57  However, the new anti-
paparazzi law punishes those driving recklessly with the intent to record 
with a misdemeanor, jail time up to six months, and a fine up to $2,500.58  
The penalties are harsher if a child is “placed in a situation in which the 
child’s person or health is endangered” due to reckless driving with the in-
tent to record someone for a commercial purpose.59  In those instances, the 
penalties include up to a year in jail and a fine up to $5,000.60 
The second major change brought by A.B. 2479 sought to curb in-
stances where paparazzi “surround stars and their families so that they have 
no possible means of escape.”61  To accomplish this, the bill incorporated 
false imprisonment into the existing privacy statute, allowing for extra 
damages for false imprisonment committed with intent to capture a visual 
or audio impression of another person.62  Though the new law did not pro-
vide a definition of false imprisonment, the legislative analysis noted that 
“presumably it would have the same meaning that it has at common law:  
that is, the intentional infliction of ‘confinement,’ with confinement defined 
as restricting a person to a confined physical space without any path of es-
cape.”63 
The City of Los Angeles, Screen Actors Guild, and Paparazzi Reform 
Initiative all offered support for the bill.64  Supporters offered several ex-
                                                           
55.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 40008 (West 2010)). 
56.  Id. 
57.  CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103(c) (West 2010). 
58.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codi-
fied as amended at VEH. § 40008(a)). 
59.  Id. (codified as amended at VEH. § 40008(b)). 
60.  Id. 
61.  Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at 1 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2009). 
62.  Id. at 2. 
63.  Id. at 4. 
64.  S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, supra note 53, at 5–6. 
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amples of why the new legislation was needed: 
 
Celebrities are routinely boxed-in when paparazzi (1) horde 
around an entranceway to a public facility to snap photographs; 
(2) park their cars in such a manner as to block-in a celebrity’s 
vehicle; (3) ram their cars into a celebrity’s car; (4) surround a 
celebrity in an airport or other public transportation facility; or 
(5) generally engage in aggressive conduct to significantly limit 
a celebrity’s freedom of movement.65 
 
Opposing the bill was the California Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion (CNPA), arguing against the “extreme criminal penalties” that could 
face the “mainstream press.”66  The CNPA feared a chilling effect on tradi-
tional newsgatherers due to the broad language of the bill.67  Further, the 
CNPA argued that A.B. 2479 unfairly targeted journalists for heightened 
penalties related to reckless driving.68  
Although A.B. 2479 transformed from a stalking and surveillance bill 
to a false imprisonment and reckless driving bill,69 the constitutional con-
cerns that prompted that transformation were not assuaged.  The next sec-
tion of this article discusses one potential First Amendment analysis of 
A.B. 2479. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF A.B. 2479 
 As with the previous legislative efforts to combat aggressive papa-
razzi, A.B. 2479 once again falls short of the constitutional protections es-
tablished by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  This section 
considers the First Amendment implications of A.B. 2479 using a variety 
of potentially applicable doctrines:  constitutional protections for news-
gathering; overbreadth; vagueness; and strict scrutiny for content-based 
regulations. 
                                                           
65.  Id. at 6. 
66.  Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at 5 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 5–6.  In a letter of opposition to Assemblyperson Bass, the CNPA stated that 
“[t]he chilling impact of this proposed language is palpable” and warned that it “would create the 
potential for extreme criminal penalties for members of the mainstream press in transit to any 
number of emergency scenes or any scene in which news is happening.”  Late Amendment Would 
Criminalize Normal Newsgathering, CNPA (Aug. 23, 2010) 
http://www.cnpa.com/full_story.cfm?id=2225. 
69.  See S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 27, 2010).  
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A.  Constitutional Protection for Newsgathering 
 The First Amendment provides explicit protections for a free press.70  
Does this mean the media gets special treatment?  It depends.  As a general 
rule, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the press’ right of access is no 
greater than that of the general public.71  However, newsgathering does 
warrant some degree of First Amendment protection, with the Supreme 
Court noting in Branzburg v. Hayes that “news gathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections . . . .”72  In his dissenting opinion in Bran-
zburg, Justice Stewart noted that “[n]ews must not be unnecessarily cut off 
at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish 
would be impermissibly compromised.  Accordingly, a right to gather 
news, of some dimensions, must exist.”73  Justice Stewart’s view of the 
press clause of the First Amendment emphasized the media’s watchdog 
role, which he described as “precisely the function it was intended to per-
form by those who wrote the First Amendment of our Constitution.”74 
Generally applicable laws, such as laws against reckless driving, are 
usually considered within the bounds of the First Amendment, even if their 
enforcement against the press might incidentally impact newsgathering.75  
The seminal case in this area is Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.76  In Cohen, 
the Minneapolis Star-Tribune sought to prevent enforcement of a promis-
sory estoppel judgment for breaching a promise of confidentiality to a 
source.77  The U.S. Supreme Court held in favor of Cohen, drawing on the 
“well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement 
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news.”78  In holding that the newspaper could not avoid liability on First 
                                                           
70.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
71.  See, e.g., Margaret Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privi-
leges, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 290 (1978) (analyzing the rejection of Justice Powell’s theory that 
the press’ right to information should be greater than the public’s right to access). 
72.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
73.  Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 
Cal. Rptr. 58, 63 (App. Ct. 1986). 
74.  Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
75.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 665. 
78.  Id. at 669; see also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (sup-
porting the proposition that the First Amendment does not “accord newsmen immunity from torts 
or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering”); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 
995–96 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that the First Amendment does not create a “wall of immunity pro-
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Amendment grounds, the Court noted that promissory estoppel was a gen-
erally applicable law that did not “target or single out the press.”79 
 California’s law, however, takes a law of general applicability—
reckless driving—and uses it to specifically single out the press for en-
hanced penalties.80  While paparazzi are arguably not members of the 
“mainstream press,”81 they are still engaged in the gathering and dissemina-
tion of information—visual images—and in many cases these photos are 
distributed by the mainstream media.  Thus, if newsgathering is not pro-
tected from laws of general applicability but does indeed deserve some 
measure of First Amendment protections, it seems that the California law 
impermissibly targets the press’ newsgathering activities.  California’s 
amended Civil Code specifically targets information gatherers (whether 
visual, audio, or other media).82  This is inconsistent with the paltry First 
Amendment protection there is for newsgathering.  Moreover, California’s 
law is patently unfair, especially considering the multitude of absurd sce-
narios that could result.  For example, a photographer rushing to the scene 
of a disaster could conceivably receive harsher punishment than someone 
driving recklessly with the intent to murder someone, rob a bank, or worse.  
The potential for such results raises serious concerns about the chilling ef-
fects on the press and its ability to gather news.  
 The false imprisonment provision of A.B. 2479, which provides en-
hanced damages if someone commits the tort of false imprisonment in the 
course of an invasion of privacy,83 also has the potential to chill newsgath-
ering efforts.  What if, for example, a crowd of television reporters sur-
rounds a politician on the courthouse steps to question him about a “per-
sonal or familial matter”?  If the politician is accused of sexually harassing 
a nanny, would this be a “personal or familial matter” wherein he should 
expect privacy protections?  Although California’s invasion of privacy 
statute carries an exception that would apply to some investigative report-
ing—allowing public or private employees with “an articulable suspicion” 
of “illegal activity or other misconduct” or other activities “adversely af-
fecting the public welfare, health or safety”—it is not clear whether this 
                                                                                                                                        
tecting newsmen from any liability for their conduct while gathering news”). 
79.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 664. 
80.  See Assemb. B. 2479, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) 
(codified as amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 40008(a)–(b) (West 2010)). 
81.  Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at 5 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). 
82.  Id. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a)–(c) (West 2009). 
83.  Id. (codified as amended at CIV. § 1708.8(c)–(d)). 
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would apply to the scenario just described, leaving open the potential to 
chill newsgathering.84 
B.  Overbreadth 
The broad sweep of the new provisions of A.B. 2479 and their poten-
tial chilling effects on the press, mainstream or otherwise, may be so broad 
that they could be declared facially invalid under the First Amendment doc-
trine of overbreadth, “whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a 
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in rela-
tion to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”85  An overbreadth analysis 
consists of construing the statute to determine how far it might reach.86  In 
the case of the reckless driving provision, photojournalists on their way to a 
disaster or emergency scene could be impacted by this law.  Although the 
new law specifies that the intent to capture an image or recording must be 
done for “a commercial purpose,” this exception will not apply to news-
gatherers, as most media outlets are for-profit.87  The false imprisonment 
provision also poses risks for newsgathering not envisioned by lawmakers, 
such as the courthouse-steps scenario from the prior section.88   
The paparazzi are a small segment of the population, creating the pos-
sibility for “a substantial number” of the law’s applications to be unconsti-
tutional.89  A Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis of the bill noted that 
“AB 2479, while laudable in its goals, could potentially have the effect of 
deterring the reporting of matters of genuine public importance or concern 
                                                           
84.  CIV. § 1708.8(g).   
 
This section shall not be construed to impair or limit any otherwise lawful activities 
of law enforcement personnel or employees of governmental agencies or other enti-
ties, either public or private who, in the course and scope of their employment, and 
supported by an articulable suspicion, attempt to capture any type of visual image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression of a person during an investigation, 
surveillance, or monitoring of any conduct to obtain evidence of suspected illegal 
activity, the suspected violation of any administrative rule or regulation, a sus-
pected fraudulent insurance claim, or any other suspected fraudulent conduct or ac-
tivity involving a violation of law or pattern of business practices adversely affect-
ing the public health or safety. 
 
85.  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (citing Washington State 
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). 
86.  See id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008)). 
87.  See Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) 
(codified as amended at VEH. § 40008(a)–(b)). 
88.  See supra Part III.A. 
89.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587. 
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simply by potentially exposing reporters to increased liability and penalties 
during the newsgathering process.”90  Thus, the potential for a significant 
number of the applications of A.B. 2479 to be unconstitutional makes the 
law particularly susceptible to invalidation under the overbreadth doctrine. 
C.  Vagueness 
 Closely related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness doc-
trine, which analyzes the First Amendment validity of a regulation based 
on clarity and how well it puts the public on notice that a particular action 
will be subject to the penalties prescribed by the regulation.91  The U.S. Su-
preme Court has noted that “‘[t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost 
as potently as the actual application of sanctions.’ . . . The danger of that 
chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be 
guarded against . . . .”92  If a statute is so vague that parties potentially sub-
ject to its provisions are unsure of its applicability, it may be struck as fa-
cially invalid under the First Amendment.93 
 California’s invasion of privacy laws, particularly A.B. 2479, are sub-
ject to invalidation due to vagueness.  It is unclear whether the press, in 
serving its traditional function as information-gatherer for the rest of the 
public, would fall under the purview of the new statutory provisions.  The 
Vehicle Code amendments of A.B. 2479 do not have the “safeguards” of 
the privacy statute in that they do not even include the limiting provisions 
of “personal or familial activity” contained in the privacy section of the 
Civil Code.94  While the “commercial purpose” language could potentially 
have been intended to distinguish between the paparazzi and the “main-
stream press,”95 the plain language interpretation would not appear to lend 
itself to such distinction.96  Further, the U.S. Supreme Court recently cau-
tioned against “the danger in putting faith in government representations of 
prosecutorial restraint.”97   
                                                           
90.  S. Judiciary Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7–
8 (Cal. June 22, 2010). 
91.  See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 
(1967) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 526 (1958)). 
92.  Id. at 604 (quoting N.A.A.C.P., 371 U.S. at 433).  
93.  See, e.g., id. 
94.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codi-
fied as amended at VEH. § 40008(a)–(b)); c.f. CIV. § 1708.8(a)–(b), (l). 
95.  Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at 5 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). 
96.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codi-
fied as amended at VEH. § 40008(a)–(b)).  
97.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591 (invalidating a federal statute banning depictions of animal 
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Again, the throng of television news cameras and reporters on the 
courthouse steps, arguably an iconic image of the American press, is help-
ful in illustrating the potential chilling effects of the false imprisonment 
provision of A.B. 2479.  The statute on its face does a poor job of putting 
people on notice of its application and, therefore, is susceptible to invalida-
tion under the void for vagueness doctrine. 
D.  Content-Based Strict Scrutiny 
 Another potential basis for invalidating the provisions of A.B. 2479 
on First Amendment grounds is the doctrine of using strict scrutiny to ana-
lyze content-based regulations on speech.  “[A] law is content-based if ei-
ther the main purpose in enacting it was to suppress or exalt speech of a 
certain content, or it differentiates based on the content of speech on its 
face.”98  In passing A.B. 2479, as well as the previous legislative attempts 
at targeting paparazzi, California lawmakers have, in effect, unilaterally 
decided that photos and recordings of celebrities not engaged in their work 
is low-value speech.  It is with disdain that lawmakers view “the public’s 
appetite to learn about even the most mundane details of the celebrities’ 
lives.”99  The impetus behind A.B. 2479 was clearly to target specific types 
of newsgatherers, and implicit in the legislation is the understanding that 
celebrity news is not news.100  Thus, the Legislature has decided what is 
newsworthy and valuable, not the press.  Yet, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted in a 2010 decision:  
 
Most of what we say to one another lacks “religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” 
(let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government 
regulation.  Even “wholly neutral futilities . . . come under the 
protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s 
sermons.”101   
                                                                                                                                        
cruelty and noting that it “would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Gov-
ernment promised to use it responsibly”). 
98.  Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 
787 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
99.  S. Rules Comm. B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
100.  See, e.g., Assemb. Judiciary Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). 
101.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)). 
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So while it might be tempting to dismiss all paparazzi activities as un-
important, they, too, deserve First Amendment protections. 
Assuming the government has indeed targeted speech of specific con-
tent (in this case, “even the most mundane details of the celebrities’ 
lives”102), the next step in the First Amendment analysis is to determine 
whether the law is “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.”103  This analysis is undertaken bearing in mind that laws that are 
content-based “are presumptively invalid.”104 
 California’s statutory scheme relating to privacy, and, now, reckless 
driving, was enacted “to attempt to rein in overzealous and aggressive pho-
tographers and reporters . . . .”105  The false imprisonment provision is 
aimed at limiting conduct that “significantly impairs a celebrity’s personal 
liberty and freedom of movement.”106  The reckless driving provisions are 
presumably efforts to curb paparazzi-celebrity chases, speeding, and other 
aggressive driving behaviors on public highways.107  Thus, it appears that 
the state has three interests:  inhibiting the behavior of celebrity photogra-
phers, discouraging the false imprisonment of celebrities, and protecting 
both celebrities and the general public from reckless driving.108  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has not recognized a compelling interest in either limiting 
the behaviors of photographers or protecting celebrities, and is highly un-
likely to do so.  The Court has, however, recognized a compelling govern-
ment interest in public safety, which is an interest promoted by the gov-
ernment in passing A.B. 2479.109   
 Assuming the government can establish a compelling interest in en-
acting A.B. 2479, in protecting public safety, it would need to prove that 
the reckless driving and false imprisonment measures were the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing its goal.110  Stated another way, there must be 
“no less restrictive alternatives that would further” the interests protected 
                                                           
102.  S. Rules Comm. B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
103.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
104.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
105.  S. Rules Comm. B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4 
(Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
106.  S. Judiciary Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. June 22, 2010). 
107.  Id. 
108.  See id. 
109.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“[T]hat primary concern of ev-
ery government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens . . . .”); see, e.g., 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
110.  See, e.g., Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. 
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by the provisions of A.B. 2479.111  The least restrictive alternatives by 
which the state could accomplish its objectives are easily found in existing 
law, which already punishes reckless driving112 and allows for civil113 and 
criminal114 actions based on the tort of false imprisonment.  In addition, 
other laws of general application, both statewide and local ordinances in 
the Hollywood area, already exist to curb the aggressive behaviors of some 
paparazzi, such as laws against sidewalk blocking, loitering, and traffic 
laws.115  Perhaps Chief William J. Bratton of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment put it best:  “We already have appropriate laws within the consti-
tutional guidelines and we intend to do that whether it is erratic driving, 
trespassing on private property or any action that goes beyond the constitu-
tional rights to cover a story.”116  Thus, even if a compelling interest could 
be found by a court considering the law, the provisions of A.B. 2479 are 
likely to fail strict scrutiny due to the existence of less restrictive alternatives. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The concerns of a small but powerful group of constituents prompted 
California lawmakers to enact several pieces of legislation aimed at pro-
tecting the privacy of celebrities.  Some of these measures are also aimed at 
preventing the general public from harm if caught in a paparazzi car chase.  
But, are the privacy rights of a select few properly elevated above the First 
Amendment guarantee of a free press?  This question goes to the heart of 
the concerns surrounding California’s “anti-paparazzi” statutory scheme, 
which includes enhanced damages for photos and recordings obtained in a 
manner offensive to a reasonable person, stiff fines for first publishers of 
such photos, authorization for government attorneys to pursue civil privacy 
actions for wrongs to celebrities, and harsher fines and increased jail time 
for reckless driving with the intent to photograph.117   
                                                           
111.  Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 958 (citing Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 
529 U.S. at 813). 
112.  CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103 (West 2010). 
113.  See, e.g., City of Newport Beach v. Sasse, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476, 482 (Ct. App. 1970); 
Scofield v. Critical Air Med., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915 (Ct. App. 1996). 
114.  CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 236-237 (West 2010). 
115.  See Richard Winton & Andrew Blankstein, Deputies Arrest Four in Crackdown on 
Paparazzi, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at B3. 
116.  Andrew Blankstein & Richard Winton, Zine Seeks to Shield Stars:  Reacting to the 
Need for a Police Escort for Britney Spears, the Councilman Wants a “Personal Safety Zone,” 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at B5. 
117.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West 2009); Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (enacted) (codified as amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 40008(a)–
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A.B. 2479, passed in 2010, is the third measure in five years aimed at 
paparazzi, despite little to no success of the previous enactments, which 
date back to 1998.  The latest anti-paparazzi laws provide enhanced dam-
ages in false imprisonment suits related to privacy violations and tougher 
penalties (including increased fines and jail time) for reckless driving if the 
driver has “the intent to capture . . . any type of visual image, sound record-
ings, or other physical impression of another person for a commercial pur-
pose . . . .”118  These amendments, much like their predecessors, are ineffi-
cient and likely unconstitutional efforts to curb paparazzi.  They do nothing 
more than existing, generally applicable laws to deter aggressive photogra-
phers except violate the First Amendment.   
Applying a variety of First Amendment jurisprudential doctrines—
constitutionally protected newsgathering, overbreadth, vagueness, and strict 
scrutiny—California’s latest anti-paparazzi measure falls short.  It singles 
out celebrity photographers whose tactics, most would agree, are unwar-
ranted and should be stopped.  Existing laws, if properly enforced, can 
achieve this goal.  Reckless driving, loitering, sidewalk blocking, and stalk-
ing are all laws of general applicability that can curb paparazzi.  In taking 
steps further than these general laws, lawmakers seek to save the people 
from their “appetite to learn about even the most mundane details of the ce-
lebrities’ lives”119 and, in the process, trample on the First Amendment. 
Rather than haphazardly pass stopgap measures in order to draw 
praise from a powerful sect of constituents (and in the process open the 
government to costly First Amendment challenges), lawmakers might con-
sider other measures, such as increased funding for law enforcement to 
properly enforce existing laws.  This could help achieve the commendable 
interest of protecting public safety (whether for celebrities on the sidewalk 
or motorists on the highways) while preserving the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                                        
(b) (West 2010)). 
118.  Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (enacted) (codified as 
amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 40008(a)–(b)). 
119.  S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, Assemb. B. 2479, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
